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Abstract. 
In 930 BC when Israel broke up into two kingdoms, the Deuteronomistic redactors raised alarm 
on the revolt against the Davidic patrimonial dynasty which retained rulership over the two tribes 
of the southern kingdom. Thus, there was the repeated reference to “the sin which Jeroboam, son 
of Nebat made Israel to sin” (1 King 16:19, 25, 31). While this reference is often made in 
relation to the setting up of two altars, one in Dan and the other in Beersheba, the central concern 
of the Deuteronomistic redactors was that the motive of unifying the nation under David the 
King par excellence, had been defeated. Thus when the Northern Kingdom with its ten tribes 
collapsed in 721 BC under the terrific military assaults of the Assyrian war lord, Shalmanesser 
V, the Deuteronomistic redactors seemed to have been vindicated that יהוה had punished severely 
those who revolted against Davidic patrimonial dynasty. The southern kingdom thus became the 
centre for repentance and unification. The eventual collapse of the southern kingdom under 
assault by Nebuchadnezzar in 605 BC thus became an enigma that defied explanation. Internal 
evidence however shows that the support for patrimonialism in monarchy in Israel was not 
unanimous and universal. Thus Rehoboam was restrained from waging a war against the 
revolting Israelite party under Jeroboam, because, according to the word from the Prophet 
Shemaiah, the war was unnecessary as יהוה had a hand in the rebellion against Davidic 
patrimonial dynasty, thus betraying the ambivalence of יהוה over patrimonial monarchy. This 
paper espouses the redactional ambivalence over patrimonialism as a factor in the collapse of 
monarchy in Israel. It goes ahead to see how the patrimonial orientation is threatening to upturn 
the practice of democracy in Nigeria. A section of the Nigerian polity has a world view that 
posits a fused religio-political system in which leadership is a matter of patrimonial bequeathal 
through a singular religio-political authority, to the extent that to contravene that world view is to 
threaten the unity of the country, and hence its survival as a geo-political entity. 
 
Introduction 
Patrimonialism is a social system in which a royal elite rules through personal and arbitrary 
control over a bureaucracy and over slaves, mercenaries and conscripts who have no power 
themselves, but serve only to enforce the monarch’s rule. Although the system started in the 
medieval centuries, traces of it can still be seen today in Asia and China in particular, as well as 
parts of the Middle East. Patrimonialism is a form of governance in which all power flows 
directly from the leader. This constitutes the blending of the public and private sector. The 
regime is usually autocratic and oligarchic and excludes the upper and middle classes from 
power.  
 
According to Weber (1922), patrimonialism is a form of political domination in which authority 
rests on the personal and bureaucratic power exercised by a royal household, where that power is 
formally arbitrary and under the direct control of the ruler. This implies that the domination is 
secured by means of a political apparatus staffed by slaves, mercenaries, conscripts, or some 
other group, which has no independent power base. By controlling the instruments of power in 
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this way, the patrimonial ruler can extend personal grace and favours, at the expense of 
traditional limitations on the exercise of authority. Sometimes, an extreme development of the 
ruler’s discretion occurs, making the patrimonial authority to shade into what Weber (1992) 
describes as sultanism. Gifford (1998) describes this system as prevalent in African states 
making them different from western societies which rest on another type of authority described 
by Weber (1992) as rational-legal authority. In the latter system, according to Gifford (1998), 
“power has come to be exercised through legally defined structures, for a publicly acknowledged 
aim”. (p. 5). The officials who operate the structures of this latter system are those who, 
according to Gifford (1998), “in exercising the power of office, treat other individuals 
impersonally, according to criteria which the structure demands”. (p. 5). 
 
Initially, patrimonialism was centered on family structures, particularly on the authority of 
fathers within families, a system commonly called patriarchy. However, patriarchy only 
describes the early, more restricted form of patrimonialism. Patrimonial monarchies and similar 
forms of government, according to Weber (1992) were projections of patriarchy (the rule of the 
father within the family) unto a broader set of social relationships. 
 
In recent times, a new trend in patrimonialism has been identified. Tagged Neopatrimonialism, it 
describes a system of social hierarchy where patrons use state resources in order to secure the 
loyalty of clients in the general population. It is an informal patron-client relationship that can 
reach from very high up in state structures down to individuals in small villages. According to 
Eisenstadt (1973), neopatrimonialism is a system of rule based on administrative and military 
personnel, who were responsible only to the ruler. Neoptrimonialsm, which is a modern form of 
the traditional patrimonial form of rule, is a mixed system. Here, elements of patrimonial and 
rational-bureaucratic rule coexist and are sometimes interwoven. 
 
Patrimonial Monarchy in Israel 
When the Prophet Samuel was giving the elders of Israel a preview of the character of the kind 
of monarchy they were asking for, which was, in fact, a D redactional, post-exilic reflection on 
the collapsed monarchy, he was, in effect, giving a vivid description of patrimonial monarchy. 
The D redactor was, in retrojective retrospection, giving the reason for the collapse of monarchy, 
thus; 
He said: these will be the ways of the king who will reign over you: he will take your 
sons and appoint them to his chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run before his 
chariots; and he will appoint for himself commanders of thousands and commanders of 
fifties, and some to plough his ground and to reap his harvest, and to make his 
implements of war and the equipment of his chariots. He will take your daughters to be 
perfumers and cooks and bakers. He will take the best of your fields and vineyards and 
olive orchards and give them to his servants. He will take the tenth of your grain and of 
your vineyards and give it to his officers and to his servants. He will take your 
menservants and maidservants and the best of your castle and your asses and put them to 
his work. He will take the tenth of your flocks, and you shall be his slaves. And in that 
day, you will cry out because of your king, whom you have chosen for yourselves; but 




A number of issues are worthy of note in this description. One is the specific character of 
patrimonial system which, according to Adams (2005), entails private appropriation of public 
office. Here, one sees a legitimization of this private appropriation for instance; your sons 
(Hebrew ּבְנֵיכֶם) to his chariot (Heb. תֹו כַבְ ְ ר ֶ ישֹו some to plough his ground, (Heb ( ּבְמ ִ ר לַחֲרֹש  חֲ  and ( וְ
reap his harvest,    (Hebrew ירֹו צִ ְ צֹר ק ְ לִק  ,(See also the legitimate contribution of the (a tenth .( וְ
(Hebrew שֹר  meaning, he shall tithe), implying a systematized private appropriation of (יַעְ
resources. There is however more evidence to believe that the admonition above was retrojected, 
and was in fact a redactive reflection on the collapsed monarchy in the post-exilic period. 
 
Monarchy in Israel, in fact, started in a patrimonial structure with Saul as the first King. A survey 
of Saul’s royal table in 1 Samuel 20:25 confirms this: “The king sat upon this seat, as at other 
times, upon the seat by wall; Jonathan sat opposite, and Abner sat by Saul’s side, but David’s 
place was empty”. A closer look at this will reveal a patrimonial setting. Jonathan, Saul’s son 
was actually second in command to the king. Abner, the Army Commander was the king’s 
cousin, and David the Commander of the internal Brigade of Guards was the king’s son-in-law. 
 
Besides Saul’s enquiry in 1 Sam. 22:7-8 suggest a situation in which servants and officers in 
government extorted land and precious items from the citizenry in a patrimonial system: 
And Saul said to his servants who stood about him; Hear now, you Benjamites; will the 
son of Jesse give every one of you fields and vineyards, will he make you all 
commanders of thousands and commanders of hundreds, that all of you have conspired 
against me? No one discloses to me when my son makes a league with the son of Jesse; 
none of you is sorry for me or discloses to me that my son has stirred up my servant 
against me, to lie in wait, as at this day. 
Dietrich (2007) has pointed out that; 
The text does not say from where he took these lands. It stands to reason that they were  
not his own, or that of his family; these lands would not have been large enough, and the 
Benjamites, according to the words used, were no stewards of royal lands but rather 
owners of their own lands and vineyards. It seems that Saul prouded them with land or 
allowed them to provide themselves with land that either was without owner or that was 
taken from previous owners. (p. 190). 
 
The second point that is evident in that address is that the officials are addressed as “You 
Benjamites” (Hebrew ינִי ִ  This implies that of the twelve tribes of Israel, only the .( ּבְנֵי־יְמ
Benjamites formed the core officials of the government. Nothing can be more confirmatory of a 
patrimonial system.  
 
The third point was that Saul was already whipping up sectional sentiments against “the son of 
Jesse” (Heb.  י ַ ן־יִׂש  an issue which lies at the heart of Saul’s bitter vexation against David, and ,( ּבֵ
his misunderstanding of Jonathan (his son)’s agreement with David. Saul was already envisaging 
a break in his patrimonial dynasty and a transfer of the throne to the house of Jesse. This had 
become more apparent since David’s brilliant outing against the Philistian war lord, Goliath of 
Gath. Saul already had eyes on a patrimonial arrangement in which power was going to pass 
down smoothly to his son Jonathan. But Jonathan, by Saul’s rating, was too naïve to understand 




Eventually, it was not very clear whether it was Saul that יהוה had rejected as king or the 
patrimonial system which he was forming. For while Saul was still on the throne, the prophet had 
been instructed by יהוה to go and anoint (Heb.  ח ׁשַ  ,one of the house of Jesse the Bethlehemite ( מָ
David by name, as king in his place (1 Samuel 16:1ff).  Saul and Jonathan were to die later in 
war. However, Abner, the commander of Saul’s army and Saul’s cousin, sustained power in the 
house of Saul, albeit in the Northern kingdom, for seven years and six months. Abner eventually 
met with David, who, all the while after Saul’s death, was king in the southern kingdom. Abner 
officially surrendered the remnant of Saul’s patrimony to David, and a new dynasty was to 
begin. 
 
Redactive Conflict in the Patrimonial Narrative 
But the monarchy narrative actually started in 1 Samuel 8:1ff. There, the actual reason for the 
demand for a king was given: 
When Samuel became old, he made his sons judges over Israel. The name of his first-
born son was Joel, and the name of his second, Abijah; they were judges in Beersheba. 
Yet his sons did not walk in his ways but turned aside after gain; they took bribes and 
perverted justice. Then all the elders of Israel gathered together and came to Samuel at 
Ramah, and said to him “Behold, you are old and your sons do not walk in your ways; 
now appoint for us a king to govern us like all the nations. 
The impression is given here that the demand for a king was prompted by the fact that Samuel’s 
sons whom he had already put into office as judges were not administering well. The implication 
of this is two-fold. One, Samuel practiced a kind of patrimonial system in which the next in 
command to him were his sons. Samuel was already orchestrating a smooth transition of power 
from himself to his sons. Two, Samuel’s patrimonial system would have been established if his 
sons had done well. Thus, the demand for a king was not necessitated by the desire to be like 
other nations, as was alleged. It was prompted simply by the fact that Samuel’s sons whom he 
placed in authority in a patrimonial administrative system were not administering creditably. In 
other words, it was not Samuel’s patrimonial system that was rejected. It was Samuel’s sons that 
were discredited. 
 
Three issues therefore stand out in the patrimonial narratives as they affect monarchy in Israel. 
One, the three key personalities involved in the monarchical history in Israel, namely, Samuel, 
Saul and David practiced patrimonialism. Two, each of the three personalities practised or at 
least envisioned a dynasty which had strong chances of success. Three, the prophetic party which 
permanently entrenched the Davidic patrimonial dynasty were but a redactive ploy employed by 
the D redactors who favoured patrimonialism over and above the redactors who were opposed to 
it. The collapsed of the northern kingdom in 721 BC was to the D redactors a confirmation of the 
anger of יהוה against the opposers of the patrimonial system. However, when the southern 
kingdom also collapsed in 605BC, bringing an end to the monarchy, that view was debunked, 
and a new reason had to be sought for the collapse of the monarchy. This new reason was to be 
crafted in the Chronicles and the Ezra-Nehemiah reforms. With this at the background, we can 
now look more closely at the event in 1 Kings 12: 1ff, the revolt against Davidic patrimonial 
dynasty. 
 
The Revolt Against Davidic Patrimonial Dynasty: The Redactional Conflict. 
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Let it be placed on record that the Davidic patrimonial dynasty became entrenched in Israelite 
monarchy by a redactional craft woven around the prophetic party, led by Nathan in 2 Samuel 
7:1fff. 
Now, when the king dwelt in his house, and the Lord had given him rest from all his 
enemies round about, the king said to Nathan the prophet, “See now, I dwell in a house of 
cedar, but the ark of God dwells in a tent. And Nathan said to the king, “Go, do all that is 
in your heart for the Lord is with you”. But that same night the word of the Lord came to 
Nathan: Go and tell my servant, David, “Thus saith the Lord: would you build me a 
house to dwell in? Moreover the Lord declares to you that the Lord will make you a 
house. And your house and your kingdom shall be made sure forever before me; your 
throne shall be established forever. 
For good or ill this was interpreted to mean the permanence of the Davidic patrimonial dynasty. 
This was long before the event of 1 Kings 12 which heralded the split of the kingdom and 
significantly the revolt against Davidic patrimonial dynasty. The antecedent to the event of 1 
Kings 12, the revolt against Davidic patrimonial dynasty, was the reign of Solomon. The 
description of the patrimonial appropriation of issues of public office to private end, as stated in 
1Kings 8:11, reached a classical apogee in Solomon. The king had married seven hundred wives 
and had three hundred concubines. And he maintained his large family with state resources, since 
in the patrimonial system there is no difference between the state fund and the ruler’s treasury. 
The heavy cost of maintaining his family including the cost of building the temple and palace 
brought heavy taxation on the citizenry. If there was any time the people should have rebelled 
against the Davidic patrimonial dynasty it was under Solomon. But somehow, the influence of 
David and the prophetic party managed to sustain the patrimonialism, but the euphoria was 
gradually dying down. This forms the basis for understanding the revolt against Davidic 
patrimonial dynasty in 1 Kings 12. 
 
Thus, in 1 Kings 12, under Rehoboam, Solomon’s son, the elders came to meet the king to solicit 
for a reduction in tasks and taxes. The reference was made directly to the reign of Solomon; 
“Your father (Hebrew  י  referring to Solomon) made our yoke heavy. Now therefore lighten , ָאבִ
the hard service of your father and his heavy yoke upon us, and we will serve you”. (1Kings 
12:4). The report went ahead to show that while Rehoboam obtained leave from the delegation 
prior to his answer, he took counsel with two different parliaments or advisory councils; namely, 
the one that served his father Solomon which he apparently inherited, and the one that he himself 
constituted upon ascending to power. This would appear like a bicameral parliament, the upper 
house and the lower house. Nyirimana (20011) has explained that:  
A pattern characteristic of patrimonialism has been the emergence of small groups of 
very influential people surrounding the heads of states, often closely related to them. In 
many cases, this group grows so powerful that they come to constitute an unofficial nerve 
centre of state power, masterminding decisions that neither the head of state nor any other 
constituted organ can overrule. (p. 714). 
 
In the case of Rehoboam, it was a bicameral kind of consultative assembly, and the monarch was 
really helpless on his own, and had no option than to echo the decision of the consultative 
council. Nyirimana went ahead to observe that: 
One of the corollaries of patrimonialism that pervaded political leadership in Israel was 
the tendency observed among the people surrounding the king to cling to the privileges 
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that they enjoyed by virtue of their kinship relationship to the king. These people would 
endeavour to hold on to power, which they deemed to be a property of their tribe, and 
were very reluctant to release it. This attitude is observed with the Benjamites when 
Abner suggested the transfer of power from Saul’s house to David’s. Abner knew that it 
was not enough to ask Ishbaal to resign, he also needed to convince the house of 
Benjamin to release the throne (2 Sam. 3:19). (p. 718). 
 
The Redactional Conflict: The Ambivalence of  יהוה 
The real redactional conflict in the narrative is seen in the two voices heard through the two 
consultative councils. The first council is called “The old men who stood before Solomon his 
father” (Hebrew יו מֹה ָאבִ נֵי ׁשְ ת־ּפְ ים אֶ ִ ד ְ יּו עֹמ ר־הַ ׁשֶ נִים אֲ ֵ ּזְק  .( הַ
 
This council is no doubt the same prophetic party, led by Nathan, which had prophetically 
entrenched the Davidic patrimonial dynasty. This was the party originally designated as the 
mouthpiece of  יהוה . 
 
The second council is called “the young men who had grown up with him and stood before him” 
(Hebrew נָיו ים לְפָ ִ ד ְ עֹמ ר הָ ׁשֶ ּתֹו אֲ לּו אִ ְ ר ּגָד ׁשֶ ים אֲ ִ יְלַד  This was the council which he himself had .(הַ
assembled upon ascending unto power. But this was also in every respect a contemporary 
patrimonial council. The issue at stake, basically, was the private appropriation of public office 
which is a central factor in patrimonialism. The matter was that Rehoboam’s father had 
excessive private appropriation of public office which brought a heavy yoke on the people. The 
request was for a reduced private appropriation of public office and hence a reduction of the 
yoke of the people. The prophetic party which had favoured the permanence of Davidic 
patrimonial dynasty foresaw a revolt and sought to soft pedal in order to avoid the revolt against 
the house of David already permanently established by the counsel of  יהוה. 
 
The council of young men, equally ardent supporters of the patrimonial system sought for a 
maintenance of the statusquo ante, that is the present level of private appropriation of public 
office. This time יהוה favoured the council of the young men in a decision that would engender a 
revolt against the Davidic patrimonial dynasty, an action which was to confirm the word of יהוה 
by another prophetic party (1 Kings 12:29).  A closer examination of the narrative would reveal a 
conflict which, rather than betraying the ambivalence of יהוה over the patrimonial import, 
showed a changing trend. A new party of informed “elders”, (Hebrew נִים ֵ זְק  led by Jeroboam ,( הַ
I, son of Nebat, already in touch with modern reforms, was advancing an idea for reform in 
Israelite patrimonialsm.  The background of Jeroboam I attests to this. According to Hubbard 
(1982): 
Jeroboam son of Nebat seems to have been a wealthy man ( יִל  Kings 11:28) able 1 ּגִבֹור הָ
to equip himself and others for war, despite the fact that his mother was a widow. 
Solomon, building the Millo, placed Jeroboam, an Ephraimite, in charge of the work 
force of the N. tribes. The king’s oppressive practices led Jeroboam to forment a revolt, 
resulting in his exile to Egypt until Solomon’s death … Rehoboam’s rash refusal to 
initiate a more clement policy than his father’s brought the fulfillment too Ahijah’s 
prophecy (1 Kings 12:29ff): the kingdom was rent asunder. Benjamin alone remained 
loyal to Judah, and became a battle ground for a series of border skirmishes between the 
two kings. (p. 565). 
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From every available information, Jeroboam was equipped with knowledge about reforms in 
government systems which, in the first instance he found unagreeable to Solomon’s patrimonial 
private appropriation of public office. So, long before Rehoboam and the split of the kingdom, 
not only Jeroboam but also a party of reformed elders constituted a dissenting voice to the 
patrimonial system under Solomon. 
 
Thus, when occasion availed, he took the opportunity to implement the government reforms 
which he (probably) wished he could have achieved under Solomon’s and Rehoboam’s reigns. 
Thus, the repeated reference to “the sin which Jeroboam sinned and which he made Israel to sin” 
(1 Kings 14:16) was the redactive criticism by the D redactors in favour of the Davidic prophetic 
party, led by Nathan, who had prophetically eternalized the throne of David. 
 
The Hausa-Fulani Quest for Patrimonial Domination in Nigeria 
It must be pointed out the Hausa-Fulani concept of power, directly derived from the Islamic 
political philosophy, is that power is total, permanent and patrimonial. Till today, the patrimonial 
system still obtains in many Arab countries and Islamic states. Whitaker (1970)captures this in 
his assertion that, “Once installed, a Fulani Emir was assailable only through extra-legal means - 
assassination, civil war, usurpation, sabotage, etc, or through the intervention of external 
authority” (p. 261).  Kukah (1993) concurs that, “When this class engaged in political activities, 
it did so within the limits of the concept of power in Hausa society, a concept guided by a 
hierarchically stratified society with the Emir at the top” (p. 5). Further elucidating on this, 
Whitaker (1970) asserts that: 
Those born to rule are at liberty to co-opt others of lower status into the orbit of the ruling 
class, and after this has been done, the new entrants achieve acquired status (Shigege). 
The dividing line between the ruling class and the ruled (Talakawa) is sharp and is best 
summed up in the Hausa proverb: Zuriyar sarki ba talakawa ba ne, (In the family of a 
king there are no poor people) (p. 415). 
Before the unification of the Northern and Southern protectorates to form the nation Nigeria, the 
Hausa-Fulani were already an organized people with a world view and a philosophy of power. 
Being brought into a country in which a democratic system of power shift would of necessity 
prevail already presented a fundamental problem to this world view and philosophy of power. 
What the country has gone through in the power tussle of these past decades attests to this. 
 
In all fairness, the Hausa-Fulani Islamic society is designed for a totalitarian system in which 
political and religious components are inextricably interwoven and authority flows from the apex 
of the religio-political authority. For such a society, it is impossible to foresee a system that is 
organized otherwise. Besides, it is impossible for the Hausa-Fulani Islamic society to foresee a 
world in which the Islamic law does not hold sway. It is for this reason that all kinds of sporadic 
crises have taken place in Northern Nigeria now and again. Paden(1973) summed up the 
situation in his composition: 
              As for the Christian, what he desires is gain 
             To cast you, or our Mallams aside 
             And to cause you to stop applying our Sharia 




Kukah (1993) told the story of a Northern Christian from Kwande in Plateau state, who had 
converted to Islam in the days of the First Republic politicking, and had joined the NPC party. 
He quoted the man, Alhaji Yahaya Kwande as saying: 
The NPC was the enemy we knew, we could only fight for our rights within the system. 
Communication was only in Hausa, and Hausa was the main language of the North, 
therefore it was necessary to stay. Some of us believed that our presence could counter 
the Hausa-Fulani control (p. 9). 
The total aspiration of the Hausa-Fulani is the establishment of an Islamic state based on the 
Sharia. This remains the aspiration of Hausa-Fulani Islamic society and nothing short of it is 
acceptable to them. In fact, it is impossible for them to imagine anything other than that. 
Suleiman agreed that Jihad was meant: 
To make the word of Allah supreme, to bring unbelief and tyranny to naught, to bring 
dignity and honour to Muslims save them from humiliation of having to live under the 
influence of an unIslamic power. (p. 4) 
This is stating the matter as it is. The Hausa-Fulani feels a deep sense on humiliation in having to 
be compelled to live under a non-Islamic authority, and in spite of all the creeds and anthems, the 
heart of the Hausa-Fulani is fundamentally opposed to a non-Islamic authority under which he is 
compelled to live. The proponents of the nationhood of Nigeria should have considered this fact 
before embarking on that costly enterprise. Ever since, a lot of blood has been shed in the 
attempt to make the experiment to work, culminating in the thirty-month civil war that wasted 
over three million lives, and inter-religious crises that have continued to waste thousands of lives 
up till this day. To the Hausa-Fulani Muslims, the commitment to the Sharia system is 
inalienable and uncompromiseable. As Kumo (1972) assets,” The state is subordinate to Sharia, 
and it is Sharia which lays down the general norms and functions of the state and all the public 
institutions of the state” (p. 41). 
 
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the concept of power among the Hausa-Fulani of 
Northern Nigeria is inalienably and uncompromisingly tied to the religious traditions of Islam. 
These traditions are patrimonial in nature, inheritance and transfer. And it is difficult for the 
Hausa-Fulani to imagine a society that is otherwise structured. 
 
In fairness, it is not the Hausa-Fulani concept of power that is to be faulted, after all they were 
already running a stable organized society before the arrival of the British colonialists. What is to 
be faulted rather is the unjust system which has compelled the Hausa-Fulani, against their 
concept of power, to live within a society where leadership would not be patrimonial, patrilineal 
and hereditary, but based on some centralized Western ideals of democracy. It is on this spot that 
the political crisis of Nigeria is hinged. The Hausa-Fulani are not democratic by orientation, nor 
are democratic principles in consonance with the patrimonial structures of their concept of 
power. 
 
In Nigeria, power has shifted from the North (the Hausa-Fulani Islamic network) for about ten 
years. In growing impatience for this considered anomaly, the more radical wing of the Hausa-
Fulani religion of Islam, called Boko Haram, has gone on rampage, unleashing mayhem on the 
country particularly in the North East. This situation is already threatening the corporate 
existence of the country and more importantly bringing to the fore the fact that the Hausa-Fulani, 
by their fundamental orientation and understanding of power, cannot exist in a society which is 
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not patrimonial in nature, that is one in which power is bequeathed along the family line and that 
in which there is an inseparable fusion between the political and the religious authorities. As 
already stated, it is not the Hausa-Fulani concept of power and religio-political fusion that is 
faulty or can be faulty. It is rather the situation that compels them to live against their wish in a 
political state whose structure is contrary to their world view that needs to be addressed in order 
to achieve a lasting peace in the country. 
 
In the text of our consideration in 1 Kings 12, the excessive private appropriation of public office 
in the patrimonial system eventually led to a revolt against the Davidic patrimonial dynasty, 
leading to a break in the kingdom in an episode in which, according to the prophetic party led by 
Ahijah, יהוה had actually supported. Perhaps in the Nigerian situation the discomfort being 
generated by the Hausa-Fulani quest for patrimonial domination, as supported by their religion 
may ultimately lead to the snapping of the collective stake, if that turns out to be the only way to 
have lasting peace and guarantee of life and property in the country. 
 
Conclusion 
The narratives regarding monarchy in Israel present two conflicting notions of the role of 
patrimonialism in the collapse of monarchy. A prophetic party, led by Nathan, speaking for יהוה 
establishes the Davidic patrimonial dynasty eternally. Another prophetic party, led by Ahijah, 
again speaking for יהוה legitimizes the revolt against the Davidic patrimonial dynasty. The 
narrative thus betrays the ambivalence of  יהוה over patrimonialism. However, internal evidence 
shows that the source of the conflict is from two redactional schools of thought. While the D 
post-exilic reflection on monarchy establishes patrimonialism as an indispensible component of 
Israelite monarchy, an enlightened reform group led by Jeroboam son of Nebat, backed by the 
prophetic party of Ahijah, advocates reforms as way of preserving the polity. 
 
In Nigeria, the Hausa-Fulani of the North have a world view which is patrimonial in nature, and 
one in which there is a total fusion between religion and the state. The Hausa-Fulani cannot 
envision a situation in which religious laws are not implemented in the state, nor can they exist in 
a society in which political authority does not issue from religious leadership. Thus, the Hausa-
Fulani world view is not in consonance with a democratic norm in which power has to be 
rotatory, leading to the possibility of being exposed to the humiliation of having to be subjected 
under a non-Islamic authority. The Hausa-Fulani world view cannot be faulted in that it serves 
the people effectively and has been serving them well prior to the intervention of the colonialists. 
What is to be faulted instead is the creation of the system which compels the Hausa-Fulani to 
live against their notion of power and authority. The prolonged negation of the Hausa-Fulani 
Islamic world view in Nigeria has given rise to a situation in which the more radical segment of 
the religion, called Boko Haram, has taken up arms against the constituted authority in the 
country. In line with the event of the split of the Israelite kingdom in 1 Kings 12, which forms 
the fulcrum of this discourse, it is probable that the only way to have lasting peace in Nigeria and 
guarantee safety of life and property is to dismantle the system which compels the Hausa-Fulani 
to live in negation of their religio-political orientation and conviction, rather than continue, albeit 
unsuccessfully, to attempt to change their religio-political orientation and conviction altogether, 
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